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MARTIN V. A-1 HOME APPLIANCE CENTER: 
 A CIVILIAN PERSPECTIVE ON RELIANCE-BASED 
THEORIES OF RECOVERY  
Bogdan Buta∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, in Martin v. A-1 Home,1 an apparently mundane case 
of personal injury (in which the victim sought to trigger the 
liability of a company that allegedly was in a master-servant2 
relationship with the tortfeasor) puts into question the practice of 
importing common law principles into matters governed by the 
Louisiana Civil Code.  
Should a Louisiana court be able to look to established 
common law principles to render a final decision when there is no 
direct and clear norm from the Civil Code nor a direct line of 
jurisprudence constante on the issue? Does this equate to the 
legislative gap contemplated by article 4 of the Louisiana Civil 
Code?3 Is the equity mentioned in article 4 enough for a judge in 
 ∗  LL.M. Candidate (2014), Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hébert 
Law Center. Research Assistant to Professor Christine Corcos. The author 
would like to thank Professor Olivier Moréteau for his guidance throughout 
writing this note. Also, special thanks are owed to Alexandru-Daniel On, 
Professor Grace Barry, and Jennifer Lane. 
 1. Martin v. A-1 Home Appliance Ctr., Inc., 12-784 (La. App. 5 Cir. 
5/30/13), 117 So. 3d 281 [hereinafter Martin]. 
 2. Though largely used in American literature, the language of “master” 
and “servant” should be replaced by the dichotomy “employer-employee,” thus 
also following the European trend in Tort Law. An example of such a transition 
can be seen in a recent Louisiana Tort Law casebook: JOHN M. CHURCH, 
WILLIAM R. CORBETT & THOMAS E. RICHARD, TORT LAW: THE AMERICAN AND 
LOUISIANA PERSPECTIVES 515-51 (Vandeplas Publ’g 2008). 
 3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4: “When no rule for a particular situation can be 
derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to 
equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing 
usages.”  
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Louisiana to immediately look at the Restatement of the Law in 
order to find a solution?4  
Apart from what may seem just a purely theoretical debate, a 
better understanding of existing civilian concepts could provide 
answers to these questions. This case note scrutinizes, in its first 
part, the flow of arguments used by the court, and, in its second 
part, offers an alternative theoretical system, consistent with the 
civil code, but with a different outcome from the decision rendered 
by the court in Martin.  
II. BACKGROUND 
The plaintiff, Mr. Martin, bought a refrigerator from one of the 
defendants, A-1 Home Appliance Center, Inc. (hereinafter A-1).5 
After purchasing the refrigerator, the defendant’s employee told 
Mr. Martin that, in exchange for a $75 fee, they would deliver the 
product to the customer's home. The plaintiff agreed and paid this 
additional service. A couple of days later, Mr. Martin was called 
and informed that the refrigerator would be delivered the next day. 
That next day, the plaintiff was called again by a representative of 
A-1, indicating that they were in the area, ready to deliver the 
refrigerator. While trying to lift the refrigerator over the kitchen 
counter inside Mr. Martin's house, the deliverymen appeared to be 
losing control of the appliance. According to Mr. Martin's 
testimony, he voluntarily and uninvitedly stepped in and grabbed 
one side of the refrigerator, trying to rebalance the refrigerator and 
prevent it from falling over the counter. Once the plaintiff got hold 
of the refrigerator, its entire weight fell upon him and resulted in 
the tearing of his right bicep muscle.6 This arm injury required 
 4. Alain Levasseur, Civilian Methodology: On the Structure of a Civil 
Code, 44 TUL. L. REV. 693, 699 (1970). Addressing this issue, the author 
concluded that “in a codified system of law, whatever is not explicitly laid down 
in the articles will of necessity lie in the domain of uncertainty and controversy.” 
 5. Martin, 117 So. 3d at 282.  
 6. Id.  
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several surgeries and a prolonged period of rehabilitation, and Mr. 
Martin sought to recover the cost of the damages incurred.  
The plaintiff found out that the deliverymen were not A-1’s 
employees as he initially thought,7 but that they were working for 
another company, Johnson Delivery Service (hereinafter Johnson); 
A-1 contracted with Johnson in order to make deliveries of its 
appliances. The plaintiff filed a personal injury action against both 
A-1 and Johnson, and their insurance companies.  
III. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL  
At trial, before the verdict was delivered, Mr. Martin settled 
with Johnson and its insurer for the amount of $100,000. 
Additionally, the jury returned a verdict exonerating A-1, and 
finding only Johnson liable for the injury. The reasoning behind 
this decision originated from the fact that there was no indication 
of an employer-employee relationship between A-1 and Johnson, 
the latter being an independent contractor.8 Following the denial of 
Martin's motion for a new trial, the plaintiff appealed the decision.9  
Mr. Martin argued that the trial judge erred in not instructing 
the jury that A-1 could be jointly liable for the acts of Johnson 
under the theory of “apparent authority.”10 The plaintiff contended 
in his appeal that this is a second theory of recovery, distinct from 
the theory of vicarious liability.11  
The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, reiterating the lack of 
any relationship between A-1 and Johnson, which would otherwise 
fall under article 2320, and also by distinguishing the fact pattern 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 283. 
 9. Id. at 282. 
 10. Id.  
 11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320:  
Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by 
their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which 
they are employed. . . .  
In the above cases, responsibility only attaches, when the masters or 
employers, teachers and artisans, might have prevented the act which 
caused the damage, and have not done it. 
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in the present case from a Louisiana Supreme Court case, 
Independent Fire Insurance Company v. Able Moving and Storage 
Company, Inc.12 The court found that the “apparent authority” 
theory was not applicable to the facts of Martin,13 and reaffirmed 
the challenged judgment.  
IV. COMMENTARY 
This commentary is divided in two parts. The first part follows 
the court’s reasoning in trying to establish whether A-1 is liable. 
The second part of the commentary suggests an alternative way of 
analyzing Martin, by using a reliance-based theory of liability 
derived from the Louisiana Civil Code (la théorie de l’apparence). 
This theory provides a different result for Martin, and, through its 
generality, might prove useful in establishing up a framework 
grounded in the Civil Code for future cases.  
A. Re-Analyzing Martin Through the Lens of General Tort Law 
Principles 
1. General Methodology  
As a matter of principle, for every wrong done by a person to 
another, outside a contractual relationship, there is a private action 
with which the victim can recover the damages incurred.14 
However, what the law designates as a “wrong”, and whether or 
not a victim has a cause of action, are questions dependent upon 
the existence of certain grounds, or foundations, for liability.15 It is 
a matter of “elementary justice” to recognize that, as a default rule, 
 12. 650 So. 2d. 750 (La. 1995) [hereinafter Able]. 
 13. Martin, 117 So. 3d at 285. 
 14. GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A 
GLOBAL CONTEXT. THE BASICS 440 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005). 
 15. Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law in WALTER VAN GERVEN, 
JEREMY LEVER & PIERRE LAROUCHE, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON 
NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW 17 (Hart Publ’g 
2000; published as part of the IUS COMMUNE CASEBOOKS FOR THE COMMON 
LAW OF EUROPE series). 
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everyone should “bear the ‘general risk associated with 
existence’”16 and that risk cannot simply pass to other 
individuals.17 Liability is an exception to this rule, and, therefore, 
without legal grounds, or a legal norm that sets out a certain 
conduct as being unlawful,18 a victim must bear her own loss.19 
Hence, tort regulation involves a constant tension between 
protecting the legal interest of society at a given moment and the 
freedom of action of each individual.20 This tension is incorporated 
in the normative process. It illustrates, or at least should illustrate, 
societal views on the kind of conduct generally considered to be 
unlawful at a given moment in time, and how such conduct ought 
to be deterred.21  
The usual grounds for liability, fault-based liability and strict 
liability, would not have served the victim in Martin. A-1 
committed no fault of its own when the acts of Johnson’s 
employee caused damage, therefore fault-based liability would not 
apply.  
Things are not necessarily as straightforward when it comes to 
strict liability, and that is why the court focused in its discussion on 
one such heading of liability: vicarious liability.22  
2. Is A-1 Liable under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2320? 
In Martin, the plaintiff raised the question of whether there was 
an employer-employee relationship between A-1 and Johnson. 
During the trial, the jury was duly instructed to answer this 
 16. Karl Larenz & Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts in 
VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 15.  
 17. Id. 
 18. “Although every tort is a wrong, not every wrong is a tort.” JOHN C. P. 
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. 
LAW: TORTS 1 (Dennis Patterson series ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
 19. Cane, supra note 15, at 17. 
 20. Larenz & Canaris, supra note 16, at 15.  
 21. VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 330. 
 22. CHURCH ET AL., supra note 2, at 515-17. Also called imputed fault, 
vicarious liability “imposes liability upon one person for the fault of another.” 
Id. 
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question, having in mind the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code 
article 2320,23 and the factors used by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in determining the existence of such a relationship.24 The 
jury established that Johnson was an independent contractor, and, 
therefore, that no liability should be imposed on A-1 for the 
tortious acts of Johnson, under this theory of recovery.25 In the 
assignments of errors, the plaintiff did not dispute this finding.26  
Under article 2320, a victim has to prove two cumulative 
elements: (1) that there is an employer-employee relationship, and 
(2) that the negligent act of the employee could have been 
prevented by the employer.27 Because the first element was not 
present, the court’s analysis stopped there.  
3. Is A-1 Liable under the “Apparent Authority” Theory? 
Mr. Martin alleged that there was an “apparent authority” with 
which Johnson was clothed to act on behalf and in the name of A-
1. He argued that the conversations he had on the phone were with 
A-1 representatives, and that he relied on the fact that A-1 would 
deliver his refrigerator to his home, in his decision to purchase the 
refrigerator. The plaintiff used the arguments from Able,28 to 
support his assertion.  
 23. Id. at 530. In Louisiana, an employer is liable for the damages produced 
by her employee while in the exercise of the functions of said employment.  
 24. Amyx v. Henry & Hall, 79 So. 2d 483, 486 (La. 1955). The Fifth Circuit 
listed the factors, but did not use Amyx as a reference. However, analyzing the 
factors is not the purpose of the present note.  
 25. Martin, 117 So. 3d at 283. 
 26. Id.  
 27. WILLIAM CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TORT LAW 
186 (2d ed., West 2009). Although the codal provision requires the second 
condition, the courts in Louisiana have consistently ignored it, and do not 
require the proof of negligence. Considering the doctrinal and jurisprudential 
dispute in this matter, it is of little importance for the study of Martin whether 
the liability under article 2320 falls under fault or no-fault liability. See also Cox 
v. Gaylord Container Corp., 897 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004) and Doe 
v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 978 So. 2d 426 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 
2007).  
 28. Able, 650 So. 2d 750 (1995). 
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Before looking at the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning with regard to 
this aspect, this commentary will make a short comparative review 
of agency law and the contract of mandate.  
a. The Contract of Mandate 
The contract of mandate is different from the concept of 
agency.29 The concept of agency encompasses a larger pallet of 
legal effects than the contract of mandate does.30 Louisiana’s 
provisions regarding the contract of mandate were initially drafted 
in a manner similar to the provisions of the French Civil Code.31 
Likewise, after the 1997 Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, the 
conceptual and functional essence of the contract of mandate did 
not change.32 
The French Civil Code did not create a institution such as the 
common law’s agency.33 It defined the institution of mandate as a 
contract whereby one person (the principal34) gives to another (the 
mandatary) the power to conclude, on his behalf, one or more 
juridical acts.35 The mandatary represents the interests of the 
principal. Given the specifics of some activities (e.g., some acts of 
commerce), the mandatary will have to execute not only juridical 
acts, but also material acts.36 This distinction bears a great 
 29. PHILIPPE MALAURIE & LAURENT AYNES, 8 COURS DE DROIT CIVIL. LES 
CONTRATS SPÉCIAUX CIVILS ET COMMERCIAUX 268 (8th ed., Ed. Cujas 1994). 
 30. Jana L. Grauberger, From Mere Intrusion to General Confusion: 
Agency and Mandate in Louisiana, 72 TUL. L. REV. 257, 265 (1997).  
 31. A. N. Yiannapoulos, Brokerage, Mandate, and Agency in Louisiana: 
Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 19 LA. L. REV. 777, 780 (1959). 
 32. Wendell Holmes & Symeon C. Symeonides, Representation, Mandate, 
and Agency: A Kommentar on Louisiana’s New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 
1158 (1999). Speaking about the changes that occurred in 1997, the authors 
conclude that “while being faithful to Louisiana’s civil heritage, the new law 
recognizes the realities of contemporary transactional practice as well as the 
need for some uniformity with the law of the surrounding common law states.” 
 33. Yiannapoulos, supra note 31, at 783. 
 34. Mandant, in French.  
 35. MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT, 2.2 TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW 
286 (Louisiana State Law Inst. trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1939). The same 
definition can be found in MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 29, at 277. 
 36. MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 29, at 272. 
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importance when it comes to liability. The French Civil Code 
chose to not expressly regulate the liability of the mandatary with 
respect to the material acts, opening the ground for the Court of 
Cassation to extend the interpretation and applicability of service 
contracts in this context (contrat d’entreprise).37 In this regard, as 
a result of business practices, often times the contract of mandate 
becomes a mixed contract, creating ancillary obligations which do 
not stem from the traditional notion of mandate.38 This is the legal 
technique by which the service contract is incorporated into the 
bigger and complex contract of mandate. Hence, the mandatary 
shall be held liable for the juridical acts according to the terms of 
the contract of mandate, and shall be liable towards the principal 
for the material acts according to the terms of the service contract. 
The principal is liable to third parties only according to the general 
theory of liability.  
The borderline between these two concepts might be blurred, 
but no arguments can be offered to stand for the proposition that 
they are similar. Louisiana Civil Code article 2989 provides that “a 
mandate is a contract by which a person, the principal, confers 
authority on another person, the mandatary, to transact one or more 
affairs for the principal.”39 The departure from the French Civil 
Code stands in that the notion of “affairs” encompasses both 
juridical and material acts. However, the Revision Comments for 
article 2989 warn the reader that most of the provisions regarding 
the contract of mandate have been construed with the juridical acts 
in mind.40 Louisiana did not import ad litteram the concept of 
contract of mandate as prescribed by the French Civil Code. 
 37. Id. at 272 n.7, citing the decision of the Commercial Section of the 
French Court of Cassation. An equivalent English translation would be “service 
contract.” A definition of “contrat d'entreprise” could provide that it is a 
convention in which the contractor undertakes an obligation to make his talent 
available to the client through a compensation previously agreed with the other 
party. GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 357 (5th ed., Quadrige/PUF 
2004). 
 38. MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 29, at 273. 
 39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2989, cmt. (d) (1997). 
 40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2989, cmt. (e) (1997).  
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Instead, the drafters might have thought that the problem regarding 
material acts could be simplified if they use the concept of “affair” 
to encompass the inclusion of both juridical and material acts.41 
b. Agency  
The attempt to find a satisfactory definition of agency is a 
rather difficult task.42 The basic hallmark of agency law is that the 
principal bears the consequences created by the fact that she chose 
to run her business through an agent.43 This view embraced by the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency points out a rather minor difference 
between agency and the contract of mandate. That is, the right of 
the principal to control the agent’s behavior and to prevent any 
wrongdoing by the agent.44 In a more complicated manner, but to 
serve the same purpose, the contract of mandate incorporates a 
service contract (contrat d'entreprise). This way, the Civil Code 
contemplates a method by which the principal has “control” over 
her mandatary’s behavior with respect to material acts. This design 
comes close to the control which agency law entails, but no degree 
of equivalence can be seen between the methods of how the 
 41. For further reading about the influence of the French Civil Code and 
doctrine, see Rodolfo Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Louisiana Projet of 
1823: A General Analytical Survey, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5, 22-24. See also 
Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and 
Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 11-12. For a different perspective, see 
Robert Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 
TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972). See also ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUIS CASIMIR 
ELISABETH MOREAU-LISLET: FOSTER FATHER OF LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW (LSU 
Law Center Pubs. Inst. 1996). 
 42. OLIVIER MORÉTEAU, DROIT ANGLAIS DES AFFAIRES 105 (Dalloz 2000). 
See also Paula J. Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 495 
(2011), for brief considerations regarding the attempts to find a proper 
definition. 
 43. The law of agency: 
[E]ncompasses the legal consequences of consensual relationships in 
which one person (the principal) manifests assent that another person 
(the agent) shall, subject to the agent's acts and on the principal's right 
of control, have the power to affect the principal's legal relations 
through the agent's acts and on the principal's behalf. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14(2)(b) (Am. Law Inst. 2006). 
 44. Dalley, supra note 42, at 513. 
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control is exerted.45 The principal’s control in a contract of 
mandate is limited to contractual obligations, while agency law 
assumes that the principal is empowered to control the facts 
concerning the agent’s behavior, contractual or non-contractual.  
This apparent theoretical distinction is important in cases 
where the agency relationship looks much like an employment 
relationship or projects an image that causes a third party to rely on 
the fact that the agent is working for the principal, because in such 
a case it might give rise to liability of the principal for the acts of 
the agent.46 In agency law, by default, the principal has a broader 
authority to control the behavior of the agent.  
The Louisiana Civil Code cannot contemplate such an 
interpretation, because the only available means of control the 
principal has over the mandatary are contractual in nature, and the 
mandatary enjoys more freedom than an agent in common law. 
The higher degree of control allowed to the principal over the 
agent in common law jurisdictions comes with heightened 
responsibility towards third parties. Despite the lower level of 
control a principal has over the mandatary, in Louisiana there have 
been cases where courts had to find a basis for imposing liability 
on a principal, when the equity of the case demanded it. Is the 
resort to the doctrine of “apparent authority” a solution?  
4. A Short History of Agency Law Intrusion in Louisiana Law 
 This tendency of departing from the codal provisions with 
regards to contract of mandate is not new.47 In accordance with the 
traditional view of the code, the courts have long supported the 
idea that vicarious liability and contract of mandate are 
 45. MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 29, at 276.  
 46. Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 32, at 1097. 
 47. Sentell v. Richardson, 29 So. 2d 852, 855 (La. 1947). In interpreting the 
former language of article 2985, which provided the definition of the contract of 
mandate, the Louisiana Supreme Court decreed that the words “‘and in his 
name’ are not essential to the definition of a procuration or power of attorney.” 
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incompatible,48 unless there is an employer-employee relationship. 
The first decision in which a court imposed liability on a principal 
for the negligent act of an agent was in Blanchard v. Ogima.49 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court simplified the analysis to find out 
whether there is an employer-employee relationship. Following 
this decision, a federal court50 dealt with the same question that 
was raised in Martin, related to “apparent authority.”51 The court 
acknowledged that it wasn't very clear whether it is possible under 
Louisiana law to impose vicarious liability on the principal for the 
negligent acts of his agent, but argued that as a federal court, they 
assume the future position of the courts, which should adopt this 
“apparent authority” theory.52 
In Rowell v. Carter Mobile Homes, Inc.,53 in an opinion 
delivered by Justice Dennis, the issue was whether a bank (a 
principal), that authorized a mobile home dealer to act as an 
undisclosed agent54 was liable for the injuries that were suffered by 
 48. Wendell Holmes, Ruminations on Independent Fire Insurance Co. v. 
Able Moving and Storage Co.: Principal's Vicarious Tort Liability for Negligent 
Acts of an Agent's Servant, 56 LA. L. REV. 571 (1996) [hereinafter Holmes, 
Ruminations]. 
 49. 215 So. 2d 902 (La. 1968) “A master or employer is liable for the 
tortious conduct of a servant or employee which is within the scope of authority 
or employment.” Id. at 902.  
 50. Arceneaux v. Texaco, 623 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter 
Arceneaux]. 
 51. The definition provided by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 
(Am. Law Inst. 1958): Apparent authority represents “the power to affect the 
legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly 
as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other's 
manifestations to such third persons.” Apparent authority is different from actual 
authority, in the sense that it is created by written or spoken words or any other 
conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to 
believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the 
person purporting to act for him. Id. § 27. 
 52. “Louisiana courts have drawn freely from the common law and the 
Restatements of the Law in developing both tort and agency doctrine. We may 
assume for present purposes, without deciding, that they would proceed along 
the Restatement path and adopt the rule of apparent authority in tort cases.” 
Arceneaux, 623 F.2d at 926. 
 53. 500 So. 2d 748 (1987) [hereinafter Rowell]. 
 54. Note that for an accurate use of legal terminology when discussing 
about the contract of mandate, the parlance involves the principal and the 
mandatary. See LA. CIV. CODE Title XV. Representation and Mandate. On the 
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the buyer of the mobile home, due to the negligent repair of the 
floor (which was performed by the bank's agent).55 The court again 
simplified the legal analysis, to the extent of whether the agent was 
an employee for the principal or not, concluding that absent any 
physical control of the agent's activity within the scope of the 
mandate given, the principal was not liable for the tortious act of 
its agent.56 This decision recited passages from Blanchard, but its 
approach remained faithful to the civilian doctrine. 
5. Louisiana Supreme Court and “Apparent Authority”  
In Able, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, in the event 
that there is no employer-employee relationship, a principal could 
become vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its “agent”, 
relying on the doctrine of “apparent authority.”57  
The facts in Able are strikingly similar to those in Martin. The 
plaintiff used the yellow pages to find a transporter for her 
furniture. She found an advertisement for a national mover, called 
“Bekins”. However, at the bottom of the advertisement there was a 
disclaimer informing the potential customers that the local operator 
of “Bekins” was a company called “Able Moving & Storage Co.” 
According to the testimony heard during the trial, the plaintiff was 
under the impression that she had hired Bekins, and had no 
knowledge at any point that she had contracted with Able. The 
moving operations were conducted by two workmen. The plaintiff 
handed them a check indicating that the recipient of the payment 
was “Bekins.” After Able’s employees left, a fire consumed the 
plaintiff’s house. It was later established that the fire was caused 
other hand, in agency law the mandatary is referred as agent. Unfortunately, 
legal scholars, judges and lawyers are using agent and mandatary 
interchangeably, though they have different meanings.  
 55. Rowell, 500 So. 2d at 749. 
 56. Id. at 751. As a side note, the court tangentially touched on the issue of 
“control.” 
 57. For a short exposé of the facts, see Holmes, Ruminations, supra note 48, 
at 572.  
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by a cigarette butt left there by one of the workmen.58 While it was 
clear that the workman and Able were liable, the plaintiff raised 
the question of whether Bekins was liable, for creating the 
impression that she was dealing with Bekins.  
The court resorted to the common law Restatement (Second) of 
Agency to motivate the application of apparent authority to a non-
contractual relationship between the principal and the victim.59 
The court also distinguished Able from Rowell, and held that when 
a principal makes a representation to a third party, there is an 
agency relationship between said principal and the agent and, 
because of this representation, the third person justifiably relies 
upon the care or skill of such apparent agent, the principal is 
subject to liability to the third party for harm caused by the lack of 
care or skill of the party appearing to be her agent.60 
The language from the decision suggests that the court read the 
applicable provisions from the Civil Code, found no explicit rule to 
apply to the facts sub judice, and borrowed the doctrine of 
“apparent authority” from the Restatement,61 in order to create a 
legal basis for imposing liability on the principal for the acts of the 
agent. Nonetheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court confused the 
concept of “apparent authority” with the concept of “agency by 
estoppel.” In a previous case also decided by the Supreme Court,62 
the court emphasized that the doctrine of “apparent authority” is 
based on a contract theory which says that a party ought to be 
bound by what she says and manifests, rather than by what she 
intends, and, therefore, the third party who contracts with the agent 
need only prove reliance on the appearance of authority 
 58. Abel, 650 So. 2d at 751. 
 59. Holmes, Ruminations, supra note 48, at 572. See also supra note 51. 
 60. Id. 
 61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (Am. Law Inst. 1958): 
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and 
thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of 
such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm 
caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant 
or other agent as if he were such. 
 62. Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 540 So. 2d 960 (1989). 
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manifested.63 Agency by estoppel is based on tort principles of 
preventing loss by an innocent person. The third party has to prove 
reliance and a change in position,64 which damaged the third party, 
and that it would be unjust to allow the principal to deny the 
existence of agency relationship.  
Although there is no explicit language in the decision,65 the 
rationale behind this solution could stem from Louisiana Civil 
Code article 4. Equally important to determine why the court 
resorted to this solution is the fact that an element of emotional 
sympathy could have weighed decisively in rendering the decision. 
Shortly after this incident, Able’s headquarter was also destroyed 
in a fire, leaving the plaintiff without any possibility of recovering 
the damages.66  
6. Applying Able to the Facts in Martin 
In Louisiana, matters pertaining to civil law which are not 
clearly resolved by the Code should not be solved by the courts 
with the doctrine of precedents, but rather resort to an established 
jurisprudence constante.67  
In Martin, the plaintiff based his entire theory of recovery on 
the rule established in Able. The court narrowed the spectrum of 
Able, focusing on the reliance element of the claim. The court 
essentially asked whether the victim’s change of position was 
determined by her reliance on the representation made by A-1. 
Conversely, in order to trigger the liability of the principal, the 
victim needed to have changed her position because of her 
 63. Id. at 963-64. 
 64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B (Am. Law Inst. 1958), 
defines a change in position as “payment of money, expenditure of labor, 
suffering a loss or subjection to legal liability.”  
 65. Nor in the previously mentioned decisions, in supra section IV.A.4. 
 66. Able, 650 So. 2d at 752-53. 
 67. Olivier Moréteau, Francois-Xavier Martin Revisited: Louisiana Views 
on Codification, Jurisprudence, Legal Education and Practice, 60 LA. BAR J. 
475, 478. See also id. at 479 n.33 for a critique of the attempt to apply the theory 
of binding precedents to cases regulated by the Civil Code.  
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reasonable belief that she dealt with a “servant or other agent”68 of 
the principal.69 In Martin, the court stated that there were no facts 
to support the proposition that Mr. Martin relied on the apparent 
authority when he made the decision to purchase the refrigerator, 
or when he allowed the deliverymen to enter on his house.70 
Johnson’s truck had no sign on it, but the deliverymen were 
wearing Johnson uniforms. Although the court acknowledged that 
the rule in Able was correct, it distinguished Martin from Able in 
the sense that in the former case, there was no evidence that the 
plaintiff “would not have made the payment had he known the 
facts of the delivery process.”71 It is also possible that, since the 
plaintiff already recovered $100,000 from Johnson, this might have 
had some influence on the decision.  
B. A Civilian Alternative to the Doctrine of “Apparent Authority” 
1. Reanalyzing Able 
One author suggested with regards to Able, that the court 
“instead of looking to agency law and apparent authority . . . need 
only have looked to the Civil Code articles.”72 This approach is 
equally applicable to Martin. This part first overviews the effects 
of the rule stated in Able, and then proposes a theory of recovery 
based on the Civil Code. 
The rule affirmed in Able has been regarded as a wrong 
decision by a small number of authors.73 The scholarship on this 
 68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (Am. Law Inst. 1958). 
 69. Able, 650 So. 2d at 752. 
 70. Martin, 117 So. 3d at 284. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Grauberger, supra note 30, at 274. 
 73. Id. at 272-73. For an approach that salutes this step taken by the 
Supreme Court, See Holmes, Ruminations, supra note 48, at 576-77, 581. The 
author calls this decision “a potentially major expansion of the doctrine of 
apparent authority by opening its application to the field of torts.” See also 
Michael B. North, Comment: Qui Facit Per Alium, Facit Per Se: 
Representation, Mandate, and Principles of Agency in Louisiana at the Turn of 
the Twenty-First Century, 72 TUL. L. REV. 279 (1997). 
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matter has drawn attention primarily upon the unintended 
consequences on the franchisor-franchisee relationship.74 It may 
seem that, in Louisiana,75 the franchisor should guard against any 
negative outcome by extending their insurance policy to cover the 
acts of a franchisee’s employees, as one author has suggested.76 
This uncertainty77 stems from the poor language used by the 
Supreme Court, which comfortably reproduced the rule existing in 
agency law.  
In 1997 (two years after Able was decided), the Civil Code was 
revised, and one of the changes involved Title XV, on the Contract 
of Mandate. The Louisiana Civil Code does not mention at any 
point “apparent authority” within Title XV (Representation and 
Mandate), or anywhere else, for that matter. The legislature 
probably intended to import the rule from the common law, and 
similarly to Able, into a codal provision, and therefore adopted 
article 3021 regarding the “putative mandatary.”78 It seems it was 
an attempt to introduce a reference to “apparent authority,” but 
through a civilian-oriented approach and with civilian terminology. 
Nonetheless, the new language from article 3021 does not offer a 
solution to cases such as Martin or Able. Rather, it is an “old wine 
in new bottle”,79 because it does not apply to tort cases. Its 
applicability is limited to contractual issues, and it regulates how 
the principal is liable toward a third party in good faith. 
 74. Holmes, Ruminations, supra note 48, at 579. The author depicts a 
common example, when a McDonald’s employee commits a tortious act. The 
question under the rule in Able is whether the victim should prove that she chose 
McDonald’s from Wendy’s or Burger King, relying on the skill and care of the 
agents, as contemplated by Section 267. 
 75. Id. at 579. See also the line of cases cited at 579 n.49, id. 
 76. Id. at 580. 
 77. Grauberger, supra note 30, at 259. The author contemplates this path as 
having “destructive effects of the introduction of common-law agency principles 
into the Louisiana legal system.” Able also affects other business areas such as 
hospitals, and large retail chains. 
 78. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3021: “One who causes a third person to believe that 
another person is his mandatary is bound to the third person who in good faith 
contracts with the putative mandatary. ” 
 79. Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 32, at 1151. 
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In addition, the current language of article 3021 ought to be 
read in conjunction with the general rules laid down in the general 
law of obligations.80 The second paragraph of article 196781 has 
the character of a general norm, and article 3021 is a special 
provision. Two rules of interpretation apply to such a situation. 
First, specialia generalibus derrogant—the special provision is 
applied with priority over the general rule, when the two come in 
conflict.82 Second, generalia specialibus non derogant—when the 
special rule is silent, the gaps can be filled by resorting to the 
general rule.83  
2. A Reliance-Based Theory of Liability 
Seemingly, there is no direct and clear norm in the Civil Code 
for a situation like the one presented in Martin. There is a gap84 in 
the legislation. In such a case, the court would have been entitled 
to proceed according to article 4. Many pages have been written 
 80. See Book III, Title 3 of the Louisiana Civil Code.  
 81. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1967: 
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have 
known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his 
detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery 
may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a 
result of the promisee's reliance on the promise. Reliance on a 
gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not reasonable. 
 82. FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE AU DROIT 450 (7th ed., 
Dalloz 2006); BORIS STARCK, HENRI ROLAND & LAURENT BOYER, 
INTRODUCTION AU DROIT 131 (3d ed., Litec 1991). 
 83. TERRÉ, supra note 82, at 450. 
 84. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1: “The sources of law are legislation and custom.” 
Articles 2 and 3 define “legislation” and “custom”. Accordingly, LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 2, provides that: “Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will.” and 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3 states that: “Custom results from practice repeated of a 
long time and generally accepted as having acquired the force of law. Custom 
may not abrogate legislation.” For the purpose of this commentary, “custom” 
presents little interest because the confusion of treating the relationship between 
principal and mandatary as a agency relationship does not meet the two 
requirements of longa consuetudo and opinio juris. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3, cmt. 
(b) (1987). 
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with respect to this article.85 Two lines of interpretation have been 
particularly relevant.  
On one hand, Justice Dennis extrapolated this provision by 
setting up a methodology which would guide the judges who are 
faced with this kind of situation.86 The author compared the judge 
to a “legislator's helpmate”87 and advocated a constant devotion to 
the civilian doctrine.88 In this interpretation, the judge should first 
try to deliver a solution according to the scope and meaning of the 
Civil Code, and only after this fails, should the judge use the 
liberty conferred by the “equity” of article 4. Regardless, the judge 
should not automatically look to common law for guidance in such 
circumstances.  
On the other hand, Professor Palmer’s article argues that this 
permanent guidance of the Code should be read less strictly, 89 and 
that this legal provision leaves room for importing common law 
rules.90 Based on this interpretation, ruling on “equity” prevails 
 85. For an extensive discussion of “equity” as referred in Louisiana Civil 
Code article 4, see Vernon V. Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed 
Jurisdiction: A Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 TUL. L. REV. 7 
(1994). See also Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Civil Code of Louisiana is Alive and 
Well, 64 TUL. L. REV. 147, 169 (1989). 
 86. James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and 
the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
 87. Justice Dennis underlined the fact that “the judge does not have absolute 
discretion but is required to return again and again to the Code seeking its 
guiding values and adhering as closely to them as possible.”  Id. at 17. 
 88. “When dealing with the civil law, the judge’s constitutional oath to 
support the law requires that he recognize that the Civil Code is the primary 
source of law.” Id. See also Grauberger, supra note 30, at 275. This author is of 
opinion that the courts are not allowed to import common law principles in the 
Louisiana Law because it is not consistent with the Constitution of Louisiana.  
 89. Palmer, supra note 85, at 19: 
In a limited number of cases [the judges] proceed by analogy from the 
Code's other provisions, as good civilian judges are thought to do. Yet 
in others, they import and transplant concepts that have no analogy 
within the Code or within the civilian vocabulary. In other instances, 
they build from the prior precedents that they established in novel 
cases.  
 90. “In Louisiana today, practitioners do not readily recognize civilian 
connotations in the term 'equity,' but they rather easily associate that word with 
particular common-law doctrines absorbed within the fabric of the law.” Palmer, 
supra note 85, at 51. 
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without any other intellectual debates, and justice should be served 
regardless of the origin of the legal solution.   
The Code as a system should not be treated as an “arbitrary and 
spontaneous product,”91 but rather as the result of the “labor of 
reason in the past centuries.”92 After reading the Louisiana Civil 
Code, it may appear that it does not provide a theory of recovery 
for the victim, with respect to the facts in Martin, but, after a closer 
look, by correlating multiple articles of the code, a theory of 
liability can be found within the spirit of the code.   
In the common law, if a principal unreasonably fails to control 
an unauthorized agent and a third party relies on the agent to her 
detriment, the principal will be liable under the theory of agency 
by estoppel.93 Similarly, civilian jurisdictions like France and 
Quebec have identified a new basis of liability in such situations 
based on a theory called “la théorie de l’apparence.”94 Based on 
this theory, reasonable reliance can be a binding source of 
obligations, very similar to a situation where the equitable remedy 
of estoppel would apply.95 Obligations are created for the benefit 
of a third party, who legitimately relied on a situation created or 
under the control of the obligor, and acted accordingly.96 The 
theory draws its origins from the Roman Law principle of error 
communis facit jus,97 but it is more developed and complex 
nowadays. French doctrine98 and jurisprudence99 developed the 
 91. Levasseur, supra note 4, at 697. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Dalley, supra note 42, at 514. 
 94. Theory of appearance, in English. 
 95. About how the common law estoppel completes the théorie de 
l'apparence, see Olivier Moréteau, Revisiting the Grey Zone Between Contract 
and Tort: The Role of Estoppel and Reliance in Mapping out the Law of 
Obligations in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2004 at 78-79 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara 
C. Steininger eds., Springer 2005).  
 96. Jean-Francois Lerouge, Uniform Computer Information Transaction 
Act: The Use of Electronic Agents Questioned under Contractual Law: 
Suggested Solutions on a European and American Level, 18 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 403, 411 (1999). 
 97. A common error is a source of law.  
 98. JACQUES GHESTIN & GILLES GOUBEAUX, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL. 
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE 757-96 (3d ed., L.G.D.J. 1990). 
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theory starting from Geny’s liberal interpretation,100 but without 
resorting to “equity” or other rules not prescribed by the Code. It is 
considered to be a theory contained in the French Civil Code, 
despite the fact that it is not based on an explicit and clear norm.  
This theory of liability can easily be fit into the framework of 
Louisiana Civil Code, and the articles regarding tort law (2315-
2322). The Civil Code already has expressions of reliance-based 
theories of liability in contractual relations. Articles 1967 and 3021 
create obligations in situations where an innocent victim relies on 
an appearance of facts to her detriment. The French théorie de 
l'apparence offers a framework for a more general basis for 
liability. 
In order to impose liability on someone based on the théorie de 
l'apparence, there are two conditions that have to be met: (1) the 
apparent situation should be different from the real, objective 
situation;101 and (2) the victim should legitimately rely on the fact 
that the situation corresponds to reality–in other words the victim 
must be in error.102  
In Martin, this theory is connected to the allegedly false 
representation to the victim that Johnson was an “apparent 
employee” of A-1. Under the test laid down above, and 
considering the facts provided in the decision, A-1 should be 
 99. The French Court of Cassation has used the theory of appearance to lift 
the corporate veil and impose liability on shareholders, who were abusing the 
privilege of incorporation. William Tetley, Q.C., Arrest, Attachment, and 
Related Maritime Law Procedures, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1895, 1944 (1999). 
 100. See FRANÇOIS GÉNY, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN 
DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF 20 (Louisiana State Law Inst. trans., 2d ed., LSLI 1954) for 
an extensive counterargument to the exegetic French school of thought. 
 101. GHESTIN, supra note 98, at 784. 
 102. The current trend in the French doctrine is that the error should be 
legitimate, which regards the standard to be that a reasonable person, if they had 
been in the same situation, would have regarded the situation as real. Prior 
theories required error to be “common”. The main difference is important as a 
practical matter, because with regard to legitimate error, the situation is analyzed 
in concreto, whereas the common error is scrutinized in abstracto (therefore 
more strictly). Id. at 771-74. 
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liable, because both conditions are met. Mr. Martin was in a 
legitimate error, mainly because he paid the delivery fee to A-1 
and because at no point he did know he would have to deal with an 
independent contractor. It does not matter whether the plaintiff 
changed his position or not. Under the théorie de l'apparence, A-1 
may be liable, and this approach also provides a better framework 
to guide courts in their approach to future similar cases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When talking about the process of drafting the French Civil 
Code, Portalis said that it is virtually impossible to anticipate all 
situations and regulate them.103 To that extent, the Martin case 
represents an exempli gratia. 
In this author’s opinion, the court in Martin had enough legal 
provisions in the Louisiana Civil Code to construct an argument in 
accordance with principles grounded in the civilian tradition. The 
resort to the common law concept of “apparent authority” was 
unnecessary, and the implementation of this concept, without 
taking into considerations the nuanced differences between the 
contract of mandate and agency, may create confusion in Louisiana 
jurisprudence.  
Based on the théorie de l'apparence, the court may have 
reached a different result in Martin. By introducing this theory, this 
case note advocates for a civilian solution to the problems that 
spring from cases such as Martin104 and Able.105 
Probably a more serious problem, discussed in passing in this 
note, can be identified in the treatment of the contract of 
mandate—in particular, the confusion created from equating 
mandate with agency. It has been argued that the codal provisions 
are behind the present business realities, and there is a need for 
 103. Alain Levasseur, Code Napoléon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 
762, 768 (1969). 
 104. 117 So. 3d 281 (2013). 
 105. 650 So. 2d. 750 (1995). 
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harmonizing the rather complex doctrine of representation.106 The 
1997 revision of the law of representation tried to keep the civilian 
terminology and conceptual framework intact, but cases like 
Martin and Able show that, in order to respect this choice of the 
legislature, one has to look at the Civil Code as a whole107 and 
interpret its provisions based on its spirit. 
 106. North, supra note 73, at 280. 
 107. LA. CIV. CODE art. 13. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
